

14 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

This paper is an attempt at a different approach to the problem of Soviet intentions in the strategic weapons field. It is an effort to describe the various compulsions which lie behind the Soviet strategic weapons build-up, to examine the nature of the competition with the United States, and to draw some of the implications for Soviet strategic weapons policies.

In years past the intelligence community has made detailed estimates of Soviet intentions in the military field, extending even to the numbers of specific weapons or weapons systems which the Soviets were likely to deploy. The National Intelligence Estimates have accordingly become very sizable documents, with a multitude of judgments, some obviously more accurate than others. Such papers may be necessary for some purposes; for others they are clearly unsatisfactory. Consequently, we have tried a new kind of paper, which may complement if not replace the old. This is the result. If its discussion is useful to you, our effort is rewarded. If not, please advise me and we will make another stab.

You will find nothing new here, but we do hope that the range of the presentation will either confirm you in your judgments, remind you of a point or two you might have overlooked, or put a different weight on certain considerations which may have become contentious in governmental debate.

Richard Helms
Director

Attachments - 2
Soviet Strategic Weapons Programs

cc: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense